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Introduction 
 
 
Central African Republic in Crisis 
African Union Mission Needs United Nations Support 
Annette Weber and Markus Kaim 
On 20 January 2014 the foreign ministers of the EU member-states approved EUFOR 
RCA Bangui. The six-month mission with about 800 troops is to be deployed as quickly 
as possible to the Central African Republic. In recent months CAR has witnessed grow-
ing inter-religious violence, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians and 
an ensuing humanitarian disaster. France sent a rapid response force and the African 
Union expanded its existing mission to 5,400 men. Since the election of the President 
Catherine Samba-Panza matters appear to be making a tentative turn for the better. But 
it will be a long time before it becomes apparent whether the decisions of recent weeks 
have put CAR on the road to solving its elementary structural problems. First of all, 
tangible successes are required in order to contain the escalating violence. That will 
require a further increase in AU forces and the deployment of a robust UN mission. 
 
In December 2012 the largely Muslim mili-
tias of the Séléka (“Coalition”) advanced 
from the north on the Central African 
Republic’s capital Bangui. This alliance led 
by Michel Djotodia was resisted by the large-
ly Christian anti-balaka (“anti-machete”) 
militias. The ensuing civil war has had 
immense humanitarian consequences, with 
different religious groups conducting tit-
for-tat massacres. The conflict is a conse-
quence of the fundamental weakness of the 
state, which ever since independence has 
proven largely incapable of providing infra-
structure, policing, justice, healthcare or 
education for its citizens. Despite possess-
ing valuable resources including diamonds, 
mineral ores and timber, CAR is one of the 
world’s ten poorest countries. Lack of state 
infrastructure forces the population to 
organise in village and family structures. 
The ongoing political and economic crises 
of recent years have led to displacements 
and a growing security threat from armed 
gangs, bandits and militias, and further 
eroded the resilience of society. Thus in 
CAR the problem of weak statehood is com-
pounded by a weak society. 
The Current Situation 
Improving security in Bangui and securing 
an aid corridor from neighbouring Cam-
eroon are the foremost objectives of the 
intervening forces. These currently com-
prise 2,000 French troops and 5,400 soldiers 
in the MISCA mission (Mission internatio-
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 nale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous con-
duite africaine) authorised in December 
2013 by the African Union. Inter-religious 
clashes began when the predominantly 
Muslim Séléka militias advanced on the 
capital Bangui. Later, fighting between 
Séléka and anti-balaka spread beyond 
Bangui. However, since the fall of Séléka-
connected President Michel Djotodia in 
January 2014, outbreaks of violence have 
primarily involved the Christian anti-balaka 
militias acting against Muslim civilians, 
rather than the two groups fighting one 
another. 
In the absence of a state monopoly of vio-
lence, criminal gangs, bandits and other 
violent actors had proliferated to a discon-
certing extent long before the arrival of 
the Séléka in Bangui. Successive presidents 
placed little trust in the regular armed 
forces (FACA, Forces armées centrafricaine), 
which comprised fewer than 5,000 soldiers, 
and instead treated the presidential guard 
as a private militia. Instead of protecting 
the population, the poorly trained and 
paid armed forces themselves represented 
a security threat. Young men armed them-
selves to protect against attacks, prepared 
to resist the national army if necessary. 
In March 2013 rebels led by Michel 
Djotodia toppled President Bozizé and took 
over the government. This also expanded 
the power of the armed wing of the Séléka, 
which despite demobilisation and integra-
tion programmes was not integrated in the 
regular national armed forces. 
In September 2013, months before he 
stepped down in January 2014, Séléka 
leader Michel Djotodia distanced himself 
from most of his militias. His intention was 
to legitimise his continuation as president 
in the eyes of the international community, 
but in so doing he also relinquished control 
over the militias. 
The leaders of the Christian anti-balaka 
militias have also long since lost control 
over their various groupings. The religious 
militias are increasingly fragmented into 
small autonomous units obeying no higher 
command, which further hampers any 
outside intervention. Members of FACA 
were also involved in atrocities in February 
2014. So neither President Samba-Panza’s 
new government nor the militia leaders 
actually have control over the violent actors. 
Furthermore, Chadian members of the 
AU mission are accused of liberating and 
evacuating detained Séléka leaders without 
authorisation from mission command. Con-
currently with the resignation of President 
Djotodia, Séléka forces began withdrawing 
from Bangui, and are currently regrouping 
in the north of the country. There too, ob-
servers report, they receive support from 
Chadian MISCA members. 
Weak State Structures 
President Djotodia was deposed on 10 Janu-
ary 2014. Ten days later parliament elected 
the mayor of Bangui, Catherine Samba-
Panza, as president. On 25 January Samba-
Panza appointed Andre Nzapayeke as prime 
minister. Nzapayeke, previously Secretary-
General of the African Development Bank, 
was chosen as a “neutral instance”. He heads 
a government of technocrats that includes 
ministers from both Séléka and the previ-
ous government of François Bozizé, designed 
to continue the transitional process agreed 
in January 2013 in Gabon’s capital Libreville 
between the then President Bozizé and the 
Séléka rebels under the patronage of the 
neighbouring states. At the end of this pro-
cess, new elections are scheduled for 2015. 
Since CAR became independent of 
French colonial rule in 1960, changes 
of leadership have generally been accom-
plished through military coups, and rarely 
through democratic elections. Especially 
since the beginning of the 2000s the coun-
try has been riven by ongoing internal 
conflict. Following the logic of clientelism, 
rulers generally concentrated on satisfying 
their own clientele, including foreign allies 
and kingmakers, and were rarely motivated 
to attend to state penetration or the needs 
of the country as a whole. The CAR is twice 
as large as Germany but has only five mil-
lion inhabitants, who live largely in the 
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 west and in the capital Bangui. Its infra-
structure is almost non-existent, further 
impeding the provision of goods and ser-
vices to the civilian population at large. 
In response to the ongoing fighting, many 
fled the urban centres to the savannah 
and the rain forest. 
Until Michel Djotodia seized power in 
a coup in March 2013, CAR was governed 
exclusively by members of the Christian 
majority from the western and central 
provinces. Djotodia, like his predecessor 
Bozizé, was supported by the Chadian gov-
ernment. As the Séléka retreat to north-
western CAR and on into Chad, the CAR 
crisis could acquire a regional dimension. 
Regional and International Actors 
Regional conflict mediators will be decisive 
for the future of CAR. Both the peace agree-
ment of Libreville and the N’Djamena Dec-
laration signed on 18 April 2013 in the 
Chadian capital were initiated by the Eco-
nomic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS) and negotiated under its auspices. 
ECCAS has also maintained a Mission 
for the Consolidation of Peace in Central 
African Republic (MICOPAX) since 2008. 
ECCAS membership overlaps with that 
of CEMAC (Communauté Économique et 
Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale), a smaller 
regional organisation that has had a multi-
national peace mission in CAR since 2002. 
On 19 December 2013 the MICOPAX mis-
sion merged into the AU-led MISCA 
mission. However, certain states involved 
in conflict pacification in CAR are also 
part of the problem. In particular, the roles 
played by France and Chad are ambivalent. 
Of all the Western external actors, France 
certainly possesses the best knowledge 
about the country, its political actors and 
its geographical conditions. But its interest 
in continuing to operate as the dominant 
external power makes France ill-suited as a 
neutral mediator. Ever since independence 
France has remained the kingmaker in 
CAR; rarely has a president gained or lost 
office without direct French influence. So 
Paris is not perceived as a neutral broker 
in the region. Instead, decades of political 
manipulation have consolidated a form of 
dependency on French interests. France is, 
moreover, specifically accused of basing its 
current engagement on its own economic 
interests. Although some suggest that 
France is interested in uranium from CAR 
as an alternative to existing sources in 
southern Algeria, northern Mali and Niger, 
falling uranium prices and the current 
conflict situation would imply that ura-
nium from CAR is not currently uppermost 
among French economic interests. In 2012 
armed gangs attacked an uranium mine 
owned by the French AREVA Group in south-
eastern CAR, and it later closed. 
Neighbouring Chad is no less closely 
involved in CAR politics, in particular 
jostling with France to direct influencing 
top political appointments. François Bozizé 
was supported by N’Djamena, and his 
troops trained and armed in Chad. Indeed, 
Chadian troops were directly involved 
in Bozizé’s coup against his predecessor 
Patassé. One important factor is the close-
ness of the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline to 
Chad’s border with CAR. Since the toppling 
of Michel Djotodia and the accession of 
President Samba-Panza, Séléka forces and 
thousands of Muslim civilians have fled 
north into Chad. This represents a chal-
lenge for Chad’s President Déby, whose 
Chadian troops operate as a MISCA con-
tingent in CAR. Although Déby is regarded 
as a supporter of the Séléka, he would not 
want see their fighters remaining in Chad. 
With ongoing fighting in Darfur and the 
conflict in South Sudan expanding, there 
is no shortage of new constellations of 
violent actors whose conflicts could have 
negative consequences for the broader 
region – and for Chad’s regional leader-
ship ambitions. 
South Africa has also exerted influence 
on CAR politics in recent years. Only after 
fifteen of its soldiers died when Séléka 
forces captured Bangui in March 2013 did 
South Africa withdraw its military contin-
gent from CAR. It is unclear why 200 South 
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 African soldiers were in the country in the 
first place. 
Although Uganda and the United States 
are not directly involved in CAR’s national 
politics, their forces have been operating 
jointly there since 2010. The fighters of 
Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 
who are held responsible for human rights 
violations in northern Uganda, South 
Sudan and north-eastern DR Congo, have 
been present in south-eastern CAR for years. 
Since 2010 the Ugandan army has been 
operating in the region, together with a 
small contingent of US marines, to mili-
tarily defeat the LRA. However, the mission, 
which involves 3,000 soldiers from the 
region and 100 US troops and has been 
operating under an AU mandate (Operation 
Monsoon) since August 2013, has remained 
unsuccessful to date. 
The Humanitarian Dimension 
All political considerations aside, the cur-
rent situation in CAR represents a humani-
tarian emergency of “epic dimensions”. 
That is the formulation UN Secretary-Gen-
eral Ban Ki-Moon chose in his address to the 
UN Human Rights Council on 20 January 
2014. The country, he said, is in “free fall”. 
Public order has collapsed, the state secu-
rity services have disintegrated, and count-
less human rights violations were commit-
ted during the fighting between Christian 
and Muslim militias. As a consequence 
about one million people have been dis-
placed, and more than 2.5 million are 
reliant on humanitarian aid. As bleak as 
the situation already is, strong tensions 
between Christians and Muslims create a 
danger of the conflict consolidating along 
religious fracture lines and continuing to 
be conducted with violence, unless external 
actors intervene. According to John Ging, 
Director of the Coordination and Response 
Division at the UN Office for the Coordi-
nation of Humanitarian Affairs, all the 
elements of violence observed in Rwanda 
and Bosnia are also present in CAR today. 
This humanitarian emergency demands 
above all funding through the United 
Nations and corresponding aid from inter-
national donors. In view of the poor secu-
rity situation and the disintegration of 
public order, however, humanitarian aid 
will remain ineffective unless external 
security forces ensure a secure environ-
ment. Because German governments have 
promised to act to prevent ethnic cleansing 
and genocide, this dimension of the situa-
tion in CAR suggests German participation 
in the EU mission there. According to the 
latest discussions, Germany will probably 
contribute a MedEvac Airbus (flying hospital) 
and staff officers for the headquarters in 
Larissa and Bangui. 
The Alliance Dimension 
Two instruments of German security 
policy have not been used to the extent that 
would have been desirable in recent years, 
and both have suffered as a result: bilateral 
Franco-German cooperation on security and 
defence, and the European Union’s Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
Both could be reinvigorated and strength-
ened through active German engagement 
in crisis management in Africa, specifically 
in CAR. 
On 20 January 2014 the foreign minis-
ters of the EU member-states decided to 
launch military mission EUFOR RCA Ban-
gui. About 800 soldiers will participate in 
the operation, which is to be deployed as 
rapidly as possible and remain in CAR for 
six months. The objective is to restore pub-
lic order in the capital Bangui and create 
conditions that allow international organi-
sations to supply humanitarian aid. The EU 
foreign ministers rejected proposals for a 
more ambitious mission that would have 
included areas outside the capital, but did 
agree that the EU contingent would relieve 
the 2,000 French troops in the country to 
an extent that allows them to be deployed 
outside Bangui. This is a “bridging mission” 
whose tasks are to be taken over after 
six months by either a UN mission or the 
African Union. 
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 When it discussed its role in Mali* in 
2013, the European Union made an in-
coherent impression. This time, its decision 
of January 2014 shows the Union deter-
mined to tackle crisis management in Africa 
using military and possibly civilian means 
in the scope of the CSDP. A German con-
tribution would not only underline Berlin’s 
willingness to do more to satisfy its inter-
national responsibilities in this field. It 
would also send European allies the im-
portant message that the German govern-
ment now attributes greater importance 
to the CSDP than it has in the past, and is 
actively seeking to shape it. 
In recent years Franco-German security 
relations have reached an unprecedented 
nadir. Diverging priorities and widely dif-
ferent foreign policy ambitions, for example 
in international crisis management or 
joint procurement projects, have muddied 
bilateral relations in this policy area. A 
clear declaration that the German govern-
ment is again seeking to deepen security 
policy cooperation with Paris could also 
give a new boost to the CSDP. The decision 
of 19 February 2014 to deploy up to 250 
German soldiers in Mali, including mem-
bers of the Franco-German Brigade, demon-
strates a reorientation of bilateral relations 
of the kind that could also occur in CAR. 
Support from AU and United  
Nations: The Limits of Enabling 
and Enhancing 
The UN Security Council authorised RCA 
Bangui on 28 January 2014, in resolution 
S/RES/2134 (2014). The resolution fits into 
the existing legal framework regulating 
international crisis management in CAR: 
resolution S/RES/2127 (2013) of 5 December 
2013 already noted that the situation in 
CAR represented a threat to international 
peace and security. On that basis, under 
chapter 7 of the UN Charter, the Security 
Council authorised the African Union’s 
MISCA stabilisation mission in CAR for 
twelve months and raised the prospect that 
MISCA could eventually be transformed 
into a UN peacekeeping mission with up 
to 10,000 troops and 1,800 police at the 
request of the African Union. The resolu-
tion also authorised the French armed 
forces in CAR to take all necessary measures 
to support MISCA in fulfilling its tasks. The 
mandate for EUFOR RCA Bangui is similarly 
doubly subsidiary, referring to support 
both of MISCA and of the French “Sangaris” 
contingent. The European Union’s support 
has already found a financial expression, 
with it providing €75 million for MISCA via 
the African Peace Facility. 
The subsidiary character of the mission 
dovetails with the latest German and 
European security concepts, under which 
national governments and other regional 
organisations should be empowered to 
undertake crisis management themselves. 
If that succeeds there is no need for the 
European Union or NATO to take on a 
direct role. 
MISCA currently has about 5,400 soldiers 
in CAR (as of early March 2014), but only 
the Rwandan contingent is actively going 
after the rival militias. It is becoming appar-
ent that the African Union lacks the politi-
cal cohesion necessary for MISCA to be suc-
cessful, and that the partiality of individual 
troop providers is endangering the effec-
tiveness of the mission. This problem is 
likely to persist even if the intervention 
is transformed into a UN peacekeeping 
mission, because the troop-contributing 
nations would in all likelihood remain 
identical. Other problems arise out of the 
subsidiary approach: three parallel but 
intertwined military missions demand a 
higher level of coordination, and respon-
sibilities become blurred. Against this back-
ground UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon 
has called for MISCA, Sangaris and EUFOR 
RCA forces to be placed under a joint com-
mand. The so-called “Enable & Enhance 
Initiative” encounters clear limits in the 
case of CAR, when it comes to estimating 
the expected success of the EU mission. 
*  See the SWP-Aktuell 
on Mali by Markus Kaim 
(8/2013, German, 
http://bit.ly/SWP13A08) 
and the Comments by 
Wolfram Lacher and  
Denis Tull (7/2013, 
http://bit.ly/SWP13C07). 
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 The Functional Dimension: 
The UN Security Council Mandate 
Anyone who proposes an EU military inter-
vention in CAR (with German participation) 
must also state what objective the proposed 
mission is to pursue, what criteria are to 
be used for assessing success or failure, and 
what timeframe is foreseen. In the case at 
hand this is particularly difficult because 
the UN mandate not only defines ensuring 
public order as a purpose of the mission, 
but also lists a complex multidimensional 
package of tasks for the UN’s political repre-
sentation in CAR since 2010, the Bureau 
intégré des Nations Unies pour la Consoli-
dation de la Paix en République centrafri-
caine (BINUCA). Alongside the aforemen-
tioned security elements, the package also 
contains a disarmament component (demo-
bilising rebel militias and integrating them 
into the regular armed forces), a humani-
tarian dimension (protecting human rights 
and caring for refugees), a rule of law 
dimension (strengthening police and judi-
cial authorities) and a political component 
(planning for a transitional government 
and restoring constitutional order in CAR). 
Most of these tasks must be fulfilled by the 
African Union and United Nations rather 
than the European Union. But whether the 
EU mission in CAR can achieve more than 
symbolic success will depend on whether 
that preparatory work is actually done, 
and done well. The UN mandate clearly in-
dicates that although comprehensive and 
lasting regulation of the conflicts in CAR 
requires a military component, it will 
be impossible without a parallel civilian 
dimension. 
The circumstances of the EU mission 
are thus a good deal more complex and 
demanding than initially expected. In the 
past comparable missions whose long-term 
success (measured not against the mandate 
but against overarching political objectives) 
depended completely or largely on the co-
operation of other international, regional 
or national actors have been problematic 
or condemned to failure. Examples in the 
African context would include EUFOR RD 
Congo in 2006 and EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 
2008/09. The more coordination is required 
between participants and the more con-
tributions of others are required in order 
to achieve a political goal through military 
engagement, the more questionable it 
becomes whether the tasks demanded by 
the UN mandate or the respective German 
policy can actually be fulfilled. All these 
concerns apply equally to the planned oper-
ation in CAR: what fall-back option would 
Germany or the EU have in the event of 
MISCA making no progress in the next six 
months, if the planned UN mission was 
dropped and/or the timetable for the politi-
cal transition process had to be shelved? 
First criticisms from the French military 
suggest that Paris has plainly underesti-
mated the dimensions of the challenge in 
CAR. 
Comparably broad UN mandates have 
in the past led Western capitals to overload 
their military operations with complex 
objectives (sometimes extraneous to the 
mandate), or conversely to equip them with 
such small capabilities that the mandate 
could never be fulfilled. The same must be 
feared in the case of CAR. The focus on the 
humanitarian dimension illustrates the 
problem. In this respect the mandate is very 
clearly defined and comparatively modest: 
EUFOR RCA Bangui will concentrate on the 
capital. But according to current reports 
thousands of internal refugees have gath-
ered not only in Bangui, but also in two 
areas around Bossangoa (300 km from the 
capital) and Bangassou (more than 700 km). 
To protect and supply them would demand 
considerable transport and security capac-
ities on the part of MISCA and the French 
contingent. Currently it is unclear how this 
situation should be dealt with. 
A slim German contribution to a small 
EU mission supporting MISCA is without 
doubt politically important from the per-
spective of Germany’s international respon-
sibility and strengthening regional security 
organisations and the United Nations. But 
it will have little impact in CAR. The worst 
case would be an appearance of success for 
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 the European Union, with the mandate 
fulfilled in the sense of securing Bangui, 
restoring public order there and feeding 
the population – but the failure of all 
political and humanitarian efforts in the 
rest of the country, leaving nothing gained 
with respect to the overaching political 
objectives. EUFOR RD Congo was confronted 
with this problem in 2006: Although it suc-
cessfully supported the UN mission in hold-
ing elections, as per its mandate, it was able 
to exert very little positive influence on 
overall political developments in DR Congo. 
Possible Steps for Germany 
In view of the crumbling state structure, 
the multitude of violent actors fighting one 
another and the devastating humanitarian 
emergency, it would be mistaken to expect 
a rapid, imminently deployable and effec-
tive military mission. Germany and the EU 
have three options for action in this situa-
tion: 
The Symbolic Option 
Germany could participate symbolically 
in the EU mission, for example with an air-
craft and a number of staff officers in the 
operation’s headquarters. This would at 
least demonstrate good will and Germany’s 
intention to accept greater responsibility 
and strengthen the CSDP. But the success of 
the European Union and a possible German 
contingent would remain geographically 
and functionally restricted, and thus illu-
sory. The restricted mandate could even 
turn the operation into a burden for Ger-
man politics, if the impression arose that 
European military contingents were watch-
ing helplessly as massive human rights 
violations occurred. Decision-makers in 
Brussels and Berlin should clearly commu-
nicate such limits in the interests of expec-
tation management. 
The Robust Option 
In this case Germany would contribute a 
larger contingent of soldiers to a mission 
in CAR, either directly in the French Opera-
tion Sangaris or a few months later in the 
planned UN mission. Both variants imply a 
presence across the entire territory of CAR, 
which is clearly associated with greater 
challenges and risks and would therefore 
be correspondingly controversial in Ger-
many. On the other hand there would also 
be a greater chance of fulfilling the essence 
of the UN mandate, namely restoring pub-
lic order throughout the country and 
enabling displaced persons to be cared for 
wherever they are located. In view of public 
promises by Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen, 
who have ruled out a “combat operation” 
in CAR, the choice of this option is, how-
ever, unlikely. 
The Civilian Option 
There are two fundamental requirements 
for comprehensive conflict management in 
CAR: rapid military intervention to contain 
the humanitarian emergency, and beyond 
that a lasting civilian engagement. The 
European Union, with the military and 
civilian components of its crisis manage-
ment, is especially well-equipped for both 
tasks. Germany, especially, has repeatedly 
called for the use of civilian instruments. 
To that extent it would be only logical if 
the German government were to supply 
substantial capacities for fulfilment of the 
non-military dimension of the UN mandate. 
These could include financial, material and 
personnel contributions, for example for 
feeding and housing refugees, establishing 
functioning security forces, improving gov-
ernance, reintegrating militias, supporting 
elections, prosecuting human rights viola-
tions, and much more. This civilian dimen-
sion has to date been little discussed in 
Germany and Europe. But it will play a key 
role in any medium- and long-term conflict 
regulation. 
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